讲座时间：2025年10月30日（周四）13:30-15:00

讲座地点：科研楼1109室

主讲人：陆卓然，上海交通大学

主持人：孙一飞，u8国际

题目：Data-Driven Hold-up and Relational Contracts  (Joint work with Limei Chen)

This paper studies how relational contracts can mitigate hold-up problems between platforms and online sellers when platforms exploit their data advantage to compete against sellers. In each period, a seller decides whether to remain on a platform and how much to invest in product innovation, which depreciates without continued investment from the seller. The platform then decides whether to copy the seller’s product. If it does, both compete; otherwise, they share the monopoly profit. We show that when products depreciate relatively fast, the optimal relational contract is stationary and efficient under sufficiently high discount factors. In contrast, when depreciation is slow, the platform always copies the seller under high discount factors, whereas cooperation can be sustained at intermediate levels. The efficiency of the relational contract depends critically on the seller’s outside option and the depreciation factor. The outside option has discontinuous and nonmonotonic effects on efficiency, implying that higher outside options may not benefit online sellers. Moreover, the depreciation factor can have opposing effects on efficiency, depending on whether the platform copies the seller when the relational contract is breached.

主讲人简介：Zhuoran Lu is an assistant professor of economics at Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University. His research interests include contract theory, information economics, organizational economics, network economics, and digital economy. His recent research includes the optimal pricing for signaling goods, network-based peer monitoring design in team works, and the role of relational contracts in the digital economy. His research work has been published in leading academic journals including Journal of Economic Theory and MIS Quarterly.