讲座时间：2025年12月4日（周四）13:30-15:00

讲座地点：科研楼1109

主讲人：杜宁华，上海财经大学u8国际教授，微观经济系系主任

主持人：李建培，u8国际教授

题目：Informed Information Design: An Experiment

Since it is common in real business practice for senders (e.g., sellers) to acquire information about states (e.g., product quality) before choosing disclosure strategies (e.g., advertising), we experimentally investigate the choice of information mechanisms by informed senders in a seller-buyer context. Theory predicts that an informed seller commits to the same (interim-optimal) noisy information mechanism in all states. However, our experimental results show that the informed seller commits to full disclosure in a favorable state but to noisy disclosure in an unfavorable state, as naïve buyers do not glean information about states from the information mechanisms. When deciding whether to follow a noisy signal, the results show that the buyer’s risk attitude plays a significant role.

主讲人简介：杜宁华，上海财经大学u8国际教授，微观经济系系主任。2005年获得美国亚利桑那大学经济学博士学位，主要研究方向是行为与实验经济学。杜宁华近年来致力于运用实验经济学的实证方法考察行为机制设计的基本问题，对市场机制进行深层次的探讨。其研究成果发表在管理学顶级国际刊物Management Science，包括Games and Economic Behavior，European Economic Review在内的经济学国际一流学术刊物上，以及Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization，Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Decision Support Systems等著名经济学和管理学国际学术期刊上。